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How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the
Second Amendment: A Reply to Professor Magarian
Glenn H. Reynolds* & Brannon P. Denning**
I.

Introduction

Following Supreme Court decisions in Heller 1 and McDonald, 2 it is
now clear that the Supreme Court has placed individual self-defense at the
core of the right to keep and bear arms.3 As courts and scholars argue over
the best method to “implement”4 this right by designing doctrinal rules to
apply in a variety of factual settings,5 many scholars have found it useful to
borrow from the Court’s First Amendment doctrine. 6 Several of these

* Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of
Law.
** Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. The authors thank the editors
of the Texas Law Review and Professor Magarian for the opportunity to comment on his piece.
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
3 . District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that the Second
Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms in the home for self-defense); McDonald v.
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (following Heller).
4. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 41–42 (2001) (arguing
that the Court’s role is to “implement” constitutional understanding through the creation and
application of constitutional doctrine). On the creation of these doctrinal “decision rules” to
implement “constitutional operative propositions,” see generally Mitchell N. Berman,
Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004).
5. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense:
An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443 (2009).
6. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-
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commentators have argued that the First and Second Amendments share a
common liberty-protecting heritage, so that borrowing from the former to
implement the latter naturally follows. 7 In a recent article, however,
Professor Greg Magarian offers a critique of this doctrinal borrowing8 and
further argues that the First and Second Amendments are actually in tension
if not in diametric opposition.9
In this brief reply, we will take issue with the second of Professor
Magarian’s critiques. We argue first that the strict dichotomy he posits
between an individual right to keep and bear arms aimed at deterring (and
furnishing the means for ultimately opposing) governmental tyranny and a
right securing the means for private self-defense is a false one. Further, we
argue that, to the extent there is any tension between the First and Second
Amendments, Heller and McDonald eased that tension by locating individual
self-defense at the core of the right. Such “modernization”10 of the right is
preferable to Magarian’s (implicit) conclusion that the Second Amendment
should have no (or little) judicially enforceable content at all.11
Part II briefly summarizes Professor Magarian’s argument. In Part III,
we then take issue with his conclusion that the only interpretation consistent
with the Amendment’s text and history is that it was intended “to prevent a
tyrannical government from disarming the people as a way to forestall
popular insurrection” and that any other reading elides the Amendment’s
“preamble.”12 In Part IV, we argue that Heller and McDonald’s placement
of individual self-defense at the core of the right to keep and bear arms can
be read as a product of judicial review’s “modernizing mission”—to borrow
(and expand somewhat) a theory offered by David Strauss.13 The Court’s
efforts, we argue, dissolve any ostensible tension between the rights
guaranteed by the First and Second Amendments and should ease Professor
Magarian’s anxieties about the suitability of an individual right to private
arms ownership in a liberal democracy.

Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (2009); Eugene Volokh, The First and
Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97 (2009).
7. See, e.g., L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, and Constitutional Interpretation, 38 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1311 (1997).
8. Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabilizes
the Second, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 49, 53–72 (2012).
9. See, e.g., id. at 98 (“First Amendment dynamism, therefore, stands as a distinctly important
antithesis to Second Amendment insurrectionism.”).
10. See generally David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 859 (2009).
11. See Magarian, supra note 8, at 99 (arguing that unless “courts . . . identify a robust
collectivist justification” for the right to keep and bear arms, “one that avoids the substantive
failings of Second Amendment insurrectionism[,] . . . a future Supreme Court may need to
acknowledge that Heller charted a constitutional road to nowhere”).
12. Id. at 76.
13. Strauss, supra note 10.
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II. Professor Magarian’s Destabilization Thesis
Professor Magarian’s article has three parts. First, he reviews and
criticizes the scholars who have argued that the First and Second
Amendments share a common concern—preservation of liberty and
prevention of governmental oppression—and that implementation of the
Second Amendment ought to naturally involve borrowing from the Court’s
free speech doctrine. 14 But while he dismisses attempts to transplant First
Amendment decision rules into a Second Amendment context, he does think
that the First Amendment can “generate other valuable, even decisive, tools
for determining the shape and legal force of the Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms.”15
In order to appreciate the proper relationship between the Amendments,
however, Magarian argues that one has to understand the function of the
Second Amendment, which, he argues, was obscured by Heller and
McDonald’s emphasis on individual self-defense. The Court’s focus, he
contends, elides the preamble, which, for him, makes clear that prevention of
governmental tyranny through a popular, well-regulated militia was the
main—indeed the sole—purpose for the Amendment.16 Heller’s insistence
otherwise, he maintains, “undermines the right’s importance for resisting
tyranny.” 17 Thus the Amendment, properly understood, embodies a
“collectivist purpose”—popular resistance to tyranny—that the Court’s
decisions ignored.18
He concedes that First Amendment theorists too have argued whether
the First Amendment is best regarded as embodying individualist or
collectivist ends. 19 “Shifts in the Supreme Court’s emphasis between
collectivist and individualist justifications have made major differences in the
development of First Amendment doctrine,” citing as an example the debate
over the Federal Communication Commission’s now-defunct “fairness
doctrine” and so-called “right of reply” laws.20 Looking at recent Supreme
Court cases, he observes that current doctrine “has moved decisively toward
the individualist justification.” 21
The unresolved tension between
individualist and collectivist readings of the First Amendment, Professor
Magarian argues, is what has contributed to the development of eclectic
decision rules governing various free speech issues.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Magarian, supra note 8, at 53–72.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 78 (citation omitted).
Id. at 83–85.
Id. at 79–81.
Id. at 81–82.
Id. at 82.
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But, he argues, no similar dialectic between individualist and
collectivist interpretations is possible with the Second Amendment because,
unlike the First, it contains a preamble that “reads as a statement of purpose”
and “explains, in general terms, what interest the right is supposed to
advance.” 22 Under his reading, the preamble forecloses an individualist
interpretation of the right to keep and bear arms, meaning that “the Second
Amendment could only bar or constrain gun regulations that impeded a
collective interest in maintaining ‘the security of a free state.’”23 Unlike the
First Amendment, which lacks a limiting principle, the Second Amendment’s
preamble “forecloses justifying the individual right to keep and bear arms in
individualist terms.”24
The “insurrectionist theory” of the Second Amendment meanwhile sits
uneasily beside a First Amendment that protects “open, robust political
debate . . . including advocacy of violent revolution” 25 at least since the
Supreme Court’s decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio.26 This commitment to
the protection of speech advocating the violent overthrow of the government,
he argues, “carries substantial reasons for not extending Second Amendment
protection to acts of insurrection.” 27 Having “long ago left the logic of
insurrectionism behind,”28 Professor Magarian worries that to re-embrace it
via the Second Amendment would risk infusing our “gun culture” with
insurrectionist thinking.29 For the Constitution to provide some sanction for
insurrection would in turn give “the political majority . . . a powerful reason
to fear advocacy of insurrection.” 30 As the majority feared insurrection
becoming a reality, the majority might move against weapons-stockpiling
“insurrectionists,” which would, of course, validate their fears about
overweening governmental power and the need for armed resistance, perhaps
igniting a real conflict.
In the end, Magarian, like Churchill, 31 prefers jaw-jaw to war-war:
“Debate enables meaningful democratic political change,” he writes, “while
threatened or actual insurrection does not.” 32 Thus he views the First
Amendment not as an analogue to the Second, but rather as its “antithesis.”33
***

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 83.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 85–86.
Id. at 88.
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
Magarian, supra note 8, at 92.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 94–95.
RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 359 (2010).
Id. at 94.
Id. at 98.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2266181

2013]

Response

93

So what are the consequences of this antagonism between the allegedly
“insurrectionist” Second Amendment and the tolerant-of-violent-advocacy
First? It’s not clear at the end of Professor Magarian’s article. On the one
hand he claims that he is neither calling into question the Second
Amendment as an individual right, nor calling on the Court to reverse either
Heller or McDonald.34 On the other, the strong implication is that both the
dynamic interpretation of the First Amendment and what he sees as the
ineluctable consequences of the Second Amendment leaves the latter with
little constructive role to play in our polity and little enforceable judicial
content.
The tension he finds between the First and Second Amendments,
moreover, depends entirely on accepting his argument that the right to keep
and bear arms sounds exclusively in a collective purpose to resist tyranny,
leading him to embrace a straw man: that the Second Amendment guarantees
a constitutional (and presumably judicially enforceable) right to engage in
armed resistance. By shining a spotlight on the preamble that mentions the
“well regulated militia,” Professor Magarian obscures that operative part of
the Amendment—that part that guarantees “the right of the people to keep
and bear arms.”35 The Second Amendment does not guarantee a right to
revolution, to armed resistance, or even the right to “alter or abolish”
government if it becomes tyrannical. Those rights are enshrined in
constitutions worldwide,36 and in various state constitutions.37 But whatever
the legal effect of such rights, they aren’t a part of the Second Amendment,
though the Framers would certainly have been familiar with such
provisions.38
Mindful that the Bill of Rights is not a suicide pact,39 and suspicious of
any interpretive method that renders a constitutional right a nullity, the
remainder of this comment will make two arguments. First, that Magarian’s
“insurrectionist” Second Amendment is not the only, or even the most

34. Id. at 74–75.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. II (emphasis added).
36 . See generally Tom Ginsburg, Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez & Mila Versteeg, When to
Overthrow Your Government: The Right to Resist in the World’s Constitutions, 60 UCLA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2125186.
37. See, e.g., KY. CONST. § 4 (“All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are
founded on their authority and instituted for their peace, safety, happiness and the protection of
property. For the advancement of these ends, they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible
right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may deem proper.”).
38 . Incidentally, the Framers might take issue with Professor Magarian’s conclusion that
“threatened or actual insurrection does not” lead to “meaningful democratic political change,”
Magarian, supra note 8, at 94, though his point is well-taken that insurrection ought not to become a
habit.
39. Cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (warning against
“doctrinaire logic” untempered by “practical wisdom” that would “convert the constitutional Bill of
Rights into a suicide pact”).
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natural, reading of the Amendment. It is possible to read the Amendment as
embodying a dual collectivist–individualist nature that Professor Magarian
ascribes to the First Amendment. In the alternative, we argue that a series of
developments since the ratification of the Bill of Rights has “modernized”
the Amendment, enabling individual self-defense to replace common
resistance to tyranny at the core of the right to keep and bear arms, while still
maintaining the potential of at least deterring would-be tyrants.
III. Revisiting the Collective Versus Individual Right Discussion
Professor Magarian argues that the first clause (or “preamble”) of the
Second Amendment “compels a collectivist construction of the Second
Amendment.”40 This is a rather strong statement considering that in Heller
and McDonald not a single Justice, whether in the majority or in dissent,
endorsed the collective rights view that for several decades was the mostcommonly-heard interpretation of the right to arms. To be fair, Magarian
has something rather different in mind from former Chief Justice Warren
Burger’s claim that the Second Amendment serves to protect the
independence of state militias, or as Burger called them, “state armies,” 41
which—given the rather drastic consequences of adopting Burger’s
approach42—is probably just as well.
Nonetheless, the argument that the Second Amendment’s preamble
compels a collectivist interpretation would itself be more compelling were it
not for William Van Alstyne’s discussion of just this topic,43 which is rather

40. Magarian, supra note 8, at 52.
41. See Press Conference Concerning Introduction of the Public Health and Safety Act of 1992,
June 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ARCNWS File.
42. For a discussion of those consequences see Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The
Second Amendment and States’ Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737
(1995). A short summary might be the Tom Lehrer line: “We’ll try to stay serene and calm/When
Alabama gets the bomb.” TOM LEHRER, Who’s Next?, on THAT WAS THE YEAR THAT WAS
(Reprise Records 1965).
43. William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE
L.J. 1236, 1243–44 (1994). Van Alstyne writes:
[T]he Second Amendment adheres to the guarantee of the right of the people to keep
and bear arms as the predicate for the other provision to which it speaks, i.e., the
provision respecting a militia, as distinct from a standing army separately subject to
congressional regulation and control. Specifically, it looks to an ultimate reliance on
the common citizen who has a right to keep and bear arms rather than only to some
standing army, or only to some other politically separated, defined, and detached
armed cadre, as an essential source of security of a free state. . . . [The Second
Amendment] expressly embraces that right and indeed it erects the very scaffolding of
a free state upon that guarantee. It derives its definition of a well-regulated militia in
just this way for a “free State”: The militia to be well-regulated is a militia to be drawn
from just such people (i.e., people with a right to keep and bear arms) rather than from
some other source (i.e., from people without rights to keep and bear arms).
Id.
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airily dismissed in a footnote. 44 But there is that business of a “well
regulated militia,” and presumably that language is meant to mean or do
something—just as, presumably, the preamble to the Constitution itself is
meant to mean or do something, though there seems to be some disagreement
on that topic as well. But what, exactly?
Well, one possibility Magarian might have considered is that the
language of the preamble is a command, aimed not at individuals but at the
federal government. If a well-regulated militia is “necessary to the security
of a free state,” then it follows, presumably, that a state lacking such a militia
is either insecure or unfree. One might argue—as Magarian pretty much
does—that whatever the truth of this statement at the time of the Framers,
such a view is obsolete because now we have a professional army and
professional police. But such an argument faces two difficulties. First, of
course, we do not get to write commands out of the Constitution simply
because we think they are obsolete; the Article V amendment process is the
approved method for addressing such changes and has been used in that
fashion in the past. Second, it is not at all clear that the presence of
professional soldiers and police addresses either the security or the freedom
that the Framers had in mind.
The Framers, after all, were as concerned with security against internal
threats and tyranny as they were in protecting against an—even then not very
likely—invasion from Canada or Mexico. The militia provided a different
kind of protection than that provided by professional police or professional
soldiers precisely because it was not a professional organization and thus not
subject to the kinds of institutional corruption and self-dealing that
professional entities are. (The function of the militia in this regard is, as
Akhil Amar has noted, that of “jurors with guns”—outsiders to the system
who are involved as a check on the system’s permanent members: “amateurs
rather than professionals, suspicious of centralized professional authority—
standing armies for the militia, professional judges and prosecutors for the
jury.”45) The absence of such a body now, except for a few entries on the
statute books here and there, might be read not as a diminution of the right to
arms, but rather as a suggestion that there is something illegitimate about our
near-total reliance on professional soldiers and professional police, just as it
would be illegitimate to rely on courts composed entirely of professional
judges and prosecutors, without a jury. (And arguments that juries are
obsolete, because judges and prosecutors are now more professional than in
the Framing era, would be persuasive to few.)
Furthermore, the limits imposed on the federal government by reliance
on a militia were in some sense like those imposed by a jury—there were just

44. Magarian, supra note 8, at 79 n.149.
45. Re-Examining the Bill of Rights, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1999, at 86, 86.
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some things the militia wouldn’t, or couldn’t, do. For example, when the
federal government attempted to send militias into Mexico in 1912, the
militias balked, citing their constitutional role as repelling invasion,
suppressing insurrection, or enforcing the law. None of these were
implicated by an incursion into a foreign country. Surprisingly, perhaps,
Attorney General Wickersham agreed. 46 The result, of course, was an
immediate change in the law, a change that made national defense much less
collectivist and much more statist: the militia was replaced with the modern
National Guard, subject to federalization by decree of the President and then,
conveniently enough, employable in the same fashion as a standing army.47
So if we are to take a “collective” lesson from the preamble to the
Second Amendment, rather than concluding that the right to arms is obsolete,
we might instead ponder whether we have taken a wrong turn in other areas,
producing a state that is, in some fundamental sense, both insecure and
unfree. Surveying the state of the nation today, it is certainly possible to
find support for this proposition. But there are further implications as well.
Though the Framers may have seen the militia as “jurors with guns,” the
militia that they envisioned was vulnerable in a way that juries are not—
because it depended on the government to provide the organizational
structure for a well-regulated militia, the militia could simply wither away
through government inaction, as, indeed, it has. But every criminal trial
requires a jury (though the appearance of rampant plea bargaining in modern
America suggests that this institution is not as strong as it once was either).
In this light, the Second Amendment could be understood as an example
of very careful drafting indeed: a government obligation (to maintain a
militia) coupled with an individual right (to keep and bear arms) that ensures
that the key element of a universal militia (an armed citizenry) cannot be
extinguished by government neglect.
At the very least, the clear
constitutional statement regarding the necessity of a well-regulated
(universal) militia for the security of a free state should give us pause. As
noted, the logical consequence of this statement is that a state lacking such a
militia is either insecure or unfree. In light of what is known about the
purposes of the Second Amendment and the Framers’ views regarding
standing armies and armed citizens, an interpretation of the first clause of the
Second Amendment as requiring universal militias seems well-founded. It
is certainly better grounded in the Constitution’s text, history, and purposes

46. See Auth. of President to Send Militia into a Foreign Country, 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 322, 329
(1912).
47. See generally Patrick Todd Mullins, Note, the Militia Clauses, the National Guard, and
Federalism: A Constitutional Tug of War, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 328, 333 (1988) (detailing the
history of the federalization of the militia system and the concomitant erosion of state control over
an ostensibly state institution).
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than many other constitutional arguments that have attained general
acceptance.
At any rate, if there are, as Magarian argues, collectivist lessons to be
taken from the Second Amendment’s preamble, we suggest that those lessons
might more plausibly involve duties on the part of the “free state” to which it
refers, than an abrogation of the rights that are the subject of the Second
Amendment’s operative clause. Such duties may be less politically
congenial than the notion of circumscribing the right to arms, but they are
also, we believe, better founded within the text and purposes of the Second
Amendment.
Finally, we would be remiss if we failed to note that there is a bit of
self-dealing in Professor Magarian’s elevation of the pen above the sword.
It is easy to understand why a law professor might value rhetoric over riflery,
but there is no particular reason to believe that those value choices were
shared by the Framers. Churchill may have believed that jaw-jaw is better
than war-war, but he also recognized that there were limits to what could be
accomplished by jaw-jawing—and there is a reason why, in the Framers’
day, the slogan Ultima Ratio Regis was engraved on cannons, and not upon
printing presses.
IV. The Second Amendment and Judicial Review’s “Modernizing Mission”
David Strauss recently identified a model of judicial review that seeks
“to bring laws up to date, rather than deferring to tradition; and that
anticipates and accommodates, rather than limits, developments in popular
opinion.”48 What Strauss terms judicial review’s “modernizing mission,” is,
he argues, an antidote to the countermajoritarian difficulty.49 Modernization
has two components: First, “courts will strike down a statute if it no longer
reflects popular opinion or if the trends in popular opinion are running
against it.” 50 As he explains, modernization keys constitutionality to the
degree of support a statute still claims—whether it “is a product of a bygone
era” or is “supported by a political consensus.” 51 Modernization, then,
enforces consensus against outliers.
Second, “a modernizing court must be prepared to change course—and
uphold a statute that the court previously struck down—if it becomes
apparent that popular sentiment has moved in a different direction from what
the court anticipated.” 52 If a court misapprehends the consensus and a
“statute had popular support after all,” it must be prepared to confess error

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Strauss, supra note 10, at 860.
Id.
Id. at 861.
Id. at 862.
Id. at 861.
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and uphold what it previously invalidated. 53 Pushback from the political
process against a court’s decision, for example, is evidence a court
miscalculated.54
We also suggest that a third type of modernization can occur, one that
Strauss does not mention explicitly, but which we think is consistent with his
idea. Not only does modernization occur at the retail level, with the Court
assessing individual statutes in light of shifts in public opinion, but also at the
wholesale level in the form of changed understandings, of constitutional
provisions, or even entire bodies of constitutional doctrine.55
While Heller and McDonald can be understood as modernizing
opinions, as Strauss defines the term, the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, we think, began the modernization of the Second Amendment
nearly one hundred and fifty years earlier, bringing the right to keep and bear
arms’ individualist component into sharper relief. This modernization, we
argue, dissolves the tension that Professor Magarian finds between the First
and Second Amendments.
As Akhil Amar and others have pointed out, the right to keep and bear
arms underwent a reinterpretation in light of the Civil War and
Reconstruction. 56 Professor Amar explains that “[c]reation-era arms bearing
was collective, exercised in a well-regulated militia embodying a republican
right of the people, collectively understood. Reconstruction gun-toting was
individualistic, accentuating not group rights of the citizenry but selfregarding ‘privileges’ of discrete ‘citizens’ to individual self-protection.” 57
Numerous references were made during the debates over the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the need to secure for the Freedmen the rights
of citizens, including the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. 58 The

53. Id. at 862.
54. Id.
55. Though Strauss doesn’t explicitly mention this phenomenon as an aspect of modernization,
he does discuss the shift from economic to noneconomic substantive due process in considerable
detail. Id. at 874–87. He writes that “modernization is . . . the central unifying theme of the
substantive due process cases that have been decided in the last forty years.” Id. at 875. We also
note that the First Amendment Professor Magarian celebrates is itself a product of similar
modernization. See generally ETERNALLY VIGILANT : FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA (Lee C.
Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002).
56. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998);
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE : THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863–1877 (1988); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866–1876 (1998).
57. AMAR, supra note 56, at 259. For reasons discussed above, we think that Professor Amar
overstates the collective nature of the framing-era Second Amendment. See supra notes 41–48 and
accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 56, at 138, 140, 164; see also id. at 203 (noting that “the
Second Amendment right to bear arms . . . [was] regarded by framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
as [a] particularly precious right[]”); HALBROOK, supra note 56, at 42 (writing that “to a man, the
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leading historian of Reconstruction concluded that “it is abundantly clear that
Republicans wished to give constitutional sanction to states’ obligation to
respect such key provisions as freedom of speech, the right to bear arms, trial
by impartial jury, and protection against cruel and unusual punishment and
unreasonable search and seizure.”59
This shift is reflected in the public understanding of the Second
Amendment’s guarantee. By the mid-1990s, overwhelming majorities saw
the Second Amendment as guaranteeing the right to private ownership of
firearms. 60 Most of the public, moreover, wants guns for self-defense, to
hunt, or for target shooting—among gun owners comparatively little thought
is given to the possible need to oppose the government en masse at some
future date. 61
Though it took the Court a while, Heller and McDonald finally caught
up with public opinion. Justice Scalia wrote in Heller that “the inherent
right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right.” 62
McDonald reiterated this understanding, holding that “[s]elf-defense is a
basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the
present day, and in Heller, we held that individual self-defense is ‘the central
component’ of the Second Amendment right.”63 In both cases, placing the
right to own weapons for self-defense at the core of the Second Amendment
resulted in the invalidation of gun laws that made lawful self-defense in the
home nearly impossible. The Court’s invalidation of these laws, then,
resembled a familiar modernizing pattern: the Court ratifies a popular
constitutional understanding and then enforces it against outlier statutes.64
***
The modernized Second Amendment places individual self-defense at
its core, in line with shifts in the popular conception of the right that began
with the proposal and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Not only
can this modernized right to keep and bear arms coexist quite comfortably
with a robust First Amendment, one might argue that the evolution was
essential to preserve First Amendment rights to criticize government. The

same two-thirds-plus members of Congress who voted for the proposed Fourteenth Amendment
also voted for the proposition contained in both Freedmen’s Bureau bills that the constitutional right
to bear arms is included in the rights of personal liberty and personal security”).
59. FONER, supra note 56, at 258.
60. For discussion of public opinion polling, see MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE : WHY
THE CONSTITUTION CAN ’T END THE BATTLE OVER GUNS 127–28 (2007).
61. See, e.g., Monte Whaley, Why Own a Gun? Colorado Gun Owners Speak Out, DENVER
POST, Oct. 28, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_21871702/guns-are-used-food-and-nottrophies-hunter (last updated Oct. 31, 2012).
62. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
63. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (footnote and citation omitted).
64. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
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Court has made clear that the state has no duty to protect individuals’ lives as
such 65 and that no one has a constitutional right to police protection. 66
Depriving individuals of the means for self-defense potentially puts them at
the mercy of the state should the state choose to withdraw police protection.
Such vulnerability could work a particular hardship on government critics.
This modernized right to keep and bear arms does not necessarily
eclipse a collectivist interpretation of the Second Amendment either. At the
very least, a widely-armed populace dramatically raises the costs for any
would-be tyrant. And we would note that if anyone does make a serious bid
for the position of tyrant, a robust First Amendment would probably not
prove as much of an obstacle as Professor Magarian would hope,
Brandenburg v. Ohio notwithstanding.
V. Conclusion
Professor Magarian argues that the Second Amendment’s right to keep
and bear arms cannot be understood outside of an “insurrectionary” context.
In the absence of an institution, like the militia, ready to perform that
function, he argues, the Amendment no longer has much work to do.
Further, he argues, the First Amendment’s right to free speech now does
much of the opposing-tyranny work that was earlier expected of the Second
Amendment. The two now exist in tension, which he implicitly resolves in
favor of the First, at the expense of the Second.
We argue that Professor Magarian’s tension between the “individualist”
and “collectivist” readings of the Second Amendment is largely of his own
making. No less than the First, the Second Amendment can be read to
embody both an individualist right (the right “to keep and bear arms”) and a
collective purpose (an armed populace would be useful for deterring the
would-be tyrant). The Framers likely would have understood individual
self-defense to have been the right to societal self-defense writ small.
In addition, the popular understanding of the core of the right began
shifting to this individual rights reading beginning at least in mid-nineteenth
century. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to secure the
right to keep and bear arms for Freedmen, not so they could rise up against
the government, but rather so they could protect themselves and their
families from violence. This “modernized” right maps onto most people’s
understanding of the right today, as reflected in the Court’s decisions in
Heller and McDonald.

65. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
66. See Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761–66 (2005) (reasoning that there is no
property or liberty interest in public enforcement of restraining orders because police protection
may be granted or denied at the discretion of the police).
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At the very least, the tradition in the U.S. has been toward an expansion
and updating of rights—not one of rendering them devoid of enforceable
content. The more the Second Amendment is treated like ordinary
constitutional law, the less scary it will eventually seem to those who worry
about its revolutionary roots.
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